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JUDGING HISTORY: HOW JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN
APPLYING ORIGINALIST METHODOLOGY AFFECTS THE
OUTCOME OF POST-HELLER SECOND AMENDMENT CASES
Mark Anthony Frassetto*
ABSTRACT
This Article aims to assess how the federal appellate courts have applied the
originalist methodology in Second Amendment cases in the decade since Heller. It
reviews how courts’ varying approaches to historical analysis—specifically, how courts
have addressed what historical period to look to, how prevalent a historical tradition
must be, and whether to address history at a high or low level of generality—can
drastically affect the outcome of cases. As Justice Scalia acknowledged in McDonald,
“Historical analysis can be difficult; it sometimes requires resolving threshold ques-
tions, and making nuanced judgments about which evidence to consult and how to
interpret it.”1 Examining how courts answer these threshold questions and make
nuanced judgments about history is necessary if courts are going to make consistent
and predictable decisions in Second Amendment cases.
In researching this Article, the author looked at fifty of the most significant Second
Amendment cases across the federal circuit courts and analyzed their treatment of
several methodological points. Ultimately, this research shows that while there is a
near unanimous national consensus within the federal circuit courts on the overall
framework for assessing Second Amendment challenges—known as the “two-step test”
or the “two-part test”—there are important unresolved methodological issues that have
an important impact on how Second Amendment cases are analyzed and decided.
These methodological issues, which exist within the consensus framework, allow
judges to influence the ultimate decision in a case while appearing to apply objective
criteria. This Article aims to bring these issues to the fore and to encourage further
consideration of these important originalist methodological points.
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INTRODUCTION
District of Columbia v. Heller marks the high point for the Supreme Court’s
originalist jurisprudence.2 Relying nearly exclusively on an originalist methodology,
the Supreme Court, for the first time, identified the right protected by the Second
Amendment as an individual right to keep and bear arms for purposes of self-defense.3
The Heller decision, which ruled on the limited issue of whether Washington, D.C.
could completely prohibit handguns within the home,4 was only the start of a wave of
Second Amendment litigation.5 In 2010, this wave became a tsunami after the Supreme
Court’s decision in McDonald v. City of Chicago incorporated the right against the
2 (Heller I), 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008); see Jamal Greene, Heller Highwater? The Future
of Originalism, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 325, 325 (2009) (discussing the reactions to the
Heller I Court’s use of originalism).
3 Heller I, 554 U.S. at 595.
4 See id. at 573–75 (citing D.C. Code §§ 7-2501.01(12), 7-2502.01(a), .02(a)(4) (2001)).
5 See Eric Ruben & Joseph Blocher, From Theory to Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis of
the Right to Keep and Bear Arms After Heller, 67 DUKE L.J. 1433, 1434–35 (2018) (discussing
the increase in “law, scholarship, and advocacy” since the Heller I decision).
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states through the Fourteenth Amendment, which allowed for widespread challenges
to state gun laws.6 Given Heller’s originalist methodology, history has played a
uniquely important role in Second Amendment litigation challenging a wide array
of federal, state, and local gun laws.
This Article aims to assess how the federal appellate courts have applied the
originalist methodology in Second Amendment cases in the decade since Heller. It
reviews how courts’ varying approaches to historical analysis—specifically, how courts
have addressed what historical period to look to, how prevalent a historical tradition
must be, and whether to address history at a high or low level of generality—can
drastically affect the outcome of cases. As Justice Scalia acknowledged in McDonald,
“Historical analysis can be difficult; it sometimes requires resolving threshold ques-
tions, and making nuanced judgments about which evidence to consult and how to
interpret it.”7 Examining how courts answer these threshold questions and make
nuanced judgments about history is necessary if courts are going to make consistent
and predictable decisions in Second Amendment cases.
In researching this Article, the author looked at fifty of the most significant
Second Amendment cases across the federal circuit courts and analyzed their treatment
of several methodological points.8 Ultimately, this research shows that while there is
a near unanimous national consensus within the federal circuit courts on the overall
framework for assessing Second Amendment challenges—known as the “two-step
test” or the “two-part test”—there are important unresolved methodological issues
that have an important impact on how Second Amendment cases are analyzed and
decided.9 These methodological issues, which exist within the consensus framework,
allow judges to influence the ultimate decision in a case while appearing to apply
objective criteria.10 This Article aims to bring these issues to the fore and to encour-
age further consideration of these important originalist methodological points.
Part I of this Article discusses the Heller decision, the post-Heller consensus
framework of the two-part test, and the methodological issues this Article addresses.
Part II examines important issues in analyzing history within the originalist frame-
work, namely which historical time periods are relevant and how to treat distinct
historical traditions within an originalist framework. Part III discusses how a court’s
narrow or broad definition of the right being burdened impacts the outcome of the
6 See 561 U.S. at 791 (plurality opinion).
7 Id. at 803–04 (Scalia, J., concurring).
8 See generally, e.g., Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2018), reh’g en banc
granted, 915 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2019) (mem.); Peruta v. County of San Diego (Peruta I), 742
F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc, (Peruta II), 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016); Nat’l Rifle
Ass’n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185 (5th Cir.
2012); Ezell v. City of Chicago (Ezell I), 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011); Heller v. District of
Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2011); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d
85 (3d Cir. 2010).
9 See infra Part III.
10 See infra Part III.
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case and, similarly, how a court’s narrow or broad consideration of historical laws
analogous to the at-issue law affects the outcome. Part IV examines how the courts
have used history in Second Amendment cases, specifically what role historical anal-
ysis plays in selecting the level of scrutiny to apply to a law that impacts a right
protected by the Second Amendment. Finally, this Article will provide some overall
conclusions, namely arguing that courts should be cognizant and transparent about the
methodological decisions they are making and draw from a broad array of historical
sources when doing the originalist analysis.
I. HELLER AND ITS PROGENY
A. The Heller Decision and Originalism
The Supreme Court’s decision in Heller, written by the late Justice Scalia, was the
end result of years of work by both scholars and attorneys advocating for an individual
rights interpretation of the Second Amendment, as well as those seeking to persuade
the Court to employ an originalist methodology of constitutional interpretation.11
The Court began its opinion by announcing it would be using original-public-
meaning originalism as its constitutional methodology—a form of originalism that
looks to how an ordinary speaker of the English language would have understood
a term in the Constitution at the time of its ratification12:
In interpreting [the Second Amendment], we are guided by the
principle that “[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by
the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and
ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.” Normal mean-
ing may of course include an idiomatic meaning, but it excludes
secret or technical meanings that would not have been known to
ordinary citizens in the founding generation.13
11 See Jennifer Tucker, Introduction to A RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS? THE CONTESTED ROLE
OF HISTORY IN CONTEMPORARY DEBATES ON THE SECOND AMENDMENT 4 (Jennifer Tucker,
Barton C. Hacker & Margaret Vining eds., 2019) (examining the historical scholarship be-
hind individual-rights interpretation leading up to the Heller decision). See generally ERIC
J. SEGAL, ORIGINALISM AS FAITH (2018) (discussing the history of the originalism debates
from the Founding until present day).
12 For an explanation of Original Public Meaning Originalism, see generally Lawrence
Solum, What Is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist Theory, in THE
CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM:THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (Grant Huscroft
& Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011).
13 Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 576–77 (2008) (second alteration in original) (first quoting United
States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931); and then citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1, 188 (1824)).
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This search for original public meaning, however, went beyond just the text of
the Second Amendment.14 This is because the Second Amendment did not create an
individual right “to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation”; instead, it
“recognize[d] the pre-existence of the right and declare[d] only that it ‘shall not be in-
fringed.’”15 As a result, the search for original public meaning went beyond the Second
Amendment’s text to the understanding of the right as it existed at the time the Bill
of Rights was ratified.16 In its search for the pre-existing original public meaning,
the Court included citations to more than 100 historical sources, stretching from the
late seventeenth to the late nineteenth century.17 These sources included seventeenth-
century English statutes,18 eighteenth-century American newspapers,19 historical
treatises,20 and late nineteenth-century state court decisions.21 The Court found these
materials—spread over 200 years of Anglo-American history—confirmed that the
Second Amendment protected an individual right to keep and bear arms.22
The Court also made clear that the right protected by the Second Amendment is
subject to traditional types of regulation.23 That limiting language, often assumed to be
a necessary compromise to secure a fifth vote from Justice Anthony Kennedy,24 stated:
Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is
not unlimited. From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases,
14 See Heller I, 554 U.S. at 576–86.
15 Id. at 592 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. II).
16 See id. at 576–86.
17 See id. Arguably, sources in Heller go as far back as the fourteenth century, as one ci-
tation to an early eighteenth-century treatise is really just a reference to a 1348 proclamation
by Edward III: “In the 21st Year of King Edward the Third, a Proclamation Issued, that no
Person should bear any Arms within London, and the Suburbs.” Id. at 587 n.10 (quoting
JOHNBRYDALL, PRIVILEGIA MAGNATUM APUD ANGLOS:OR, A DECLARATION OF THE DIVERS
AND SUNDRY PREHEMINENCIES, OR PRIVILEGES, ALLOWED BY THE LAWS, AND CUSTOMS OF
ENGLAND, UNTO THE FIRST-BORN AMONG HER MAJESTIES SUBJECTS, THE TEMPORAL LORDS
OF PARLIAMENT XXXIII (London, 1704)).
18 See id. at 582, 587–88, 593.
19 See id. at 594, 604.
20 See id. at 577, 582, 607.
21 See id. at 585–86.
22 See id. at 602, 605–18.
23 See id. at 626–27.
24 See, e.g., Nina Totenberg, Moderator, Guns and the Supreme Court at the Aspen
Institute, Washington D.C., at 16:13 (Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.aspeninstitute.org/videos
/guns-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/FR2G-36XD] (Moderating a discussion on guns and
the judiciary, Nina Totenberg, Legal Affairs Correspondent for NPR, described a dinner
conversation with Justice Scalia shortly after Heller I: “I said to the Justice, ‘You know that
section, the . . . not going to have an exhaustive list section, doesn’t really sound like you.
It sounds more like your fifth vote, Justice Kennedy [presumably].’ And he—here’s the shrug
part—, he went [shrugging motion and sound].”).
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commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was
not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any man-
ner whatsoever and for whatever purpose . . . . Although we do
not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full
scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should
be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the pos-
session of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbid-
ding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools
and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.25
The Heller majority also stated that “prohibitions on carrying concealed weap-
ons” have generally been upheld and bans on “M-16 rifles and the like” are constitu-
tional, even though those weapons could be useful in militia service.26 In a footnote,
the Court also made clear that the enumerated lawful regulations in the decision were
only examples, stating the list did “not purport to be exhaustive.”27 By providing a
non-exhaustive list of presumptively constitutional regulations, the Court left open
what other regulations are presumptively constitutional and why, as well as the
meaning of “longstanding.”28
B. Post-Heller Litigation and the Two-Step Framework
The Heller majority abstained from creating a legal framework to analyze future
Second Amendment cases and acknowledged that the Court could not “clarify the
entire field” in its “first in-depth examination of the Second Amendment.”29 In the
absence of detailed guidance from the Supreme Court, the federal appellate courts
have uniformly adopted a framework known as “the two-step test.”30 Under the two-
step test, courts first analyze whether a challenged law regulates conduct protected
by the Second Amendment.31 To make this determination, courts rely primarily on
the text, history, and tradition of the right to keep and bear arms, as well as Heller,
McDonald, and relevant decisions from federal courts of appeals.32 That is, courts
25 Heller I, 554 U.S. at 626–27.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 627 n.26.
28 See id. at 721 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s non-exhaustive list of
gun prohibitions that would be constitutional).
29 See id. at 635.
30 See, e.g., United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010).
31 See id.
32 See, e.g., id. at 89–91; Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms,
& Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012); Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1252 (D.C. Cir.
2011); Ezell I, 651 F.3d 684, 701–04 (7th Cir. 2011); see also C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t
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look to whether “the law harmonizes with the historical traditions associated with the
Second Amendment guarantee.”33 This analysis centers on whether the challenged
law is “longstanding,” because Heller stated certain “longstanding” provisions are
“presumptively lawful” and allowed for the identification of additional presump-
tively lawful provisions through “an exhaustive historical analysis.”34
If, after conducting the step one analysis, a court determines the regulated conduct
falls outside the scope of the Second Amendment, the court will uphold the law
(unless it was challenged on other grounds).35 If a court finds the regulated conduct
is covered by the Second Amendment, then the court applies one of the traditional
tiers of constitutional scrutiny, which ask how important the government interest is and
whether the regulation is adequately tailored to accomplish that interest.36 The re-
quired showing by the government depends on how much of an impact the regulation
has on the Second Amendment right and whether the challenged law affects the core
or peripheries of the Second Amendment, ranging from essentially no showing neces-
sary for regulations that are de minimis impingements to categorical rejection of the
most extreme regulations such as the handgun ban at issue in Heller.37
C. Methodological Questions at Step One of the Two-Step Analysis
Courts implementing step one of the originalist analysis in the wake of Heller
must make several important methodological decisions.38 What historical time period
Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 HARV.J.L.&PUB.POL’Y 695 (2009) (discussing the possi-
ble inconsistency with the Heller I decision’s identification of prohibitions on firearm possession
by felons as longstanding and the history of gun regulation).
33 Nat’l Rifle Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 194 (citing Heller I, 554 U.S. at 577–628).
34 Heller I, 554 U.S. at 626–27, 627 n.25.
35 See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89.
36 See id.; Nat’l Rifle Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 195.
37 Some courts have rejected the tiers of scrutiny and opted to simply strike down laws
with a severe impact on the Second Amendment right without applying any of the traditional
tiers of scrutiny. See Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 666 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e
needn’t pause to apply tiers of scrutiny, as if strong enough showings of public benefits could
save this destruction of so many commonly situated D.C. residents’ constitutional right to
bear common arms for self-defense in any fashion at all. Bans on the ability of most citizens
to exercise an enumerated right would have to flunk any judicial test that was appropriately
written and applied, so we strike down the District’s law here apart from any particular
balancing test.”). In many cases a court’s characterization of a challenged regulation as a
“ban” is decisive in determining its validity. See Joseph Blocher, Bans, 129 YALE L.J. 308,
311–13 (2019).
38 Many of the leading originalist scholars have suggested that both steps of the two-step
framework should rightfully be considered part of an originalist analysis. See generally, e.g.,
Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Letter and the Spirit: A Unified Theory of Original-
ism, 107 GEO. L.J. 1 (2018). This scholarship distinguishes between the concepts of consti-
tutional interpretation—the process of discovering the linguistic meaning or semantic content of
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should be considered when assessing the scope of the right to keep and bear arms?39
Most notably, should the scope of the right as applicable to the states be assessed at the
time of the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Second Amend-
ment?40 What is the relevant historical time period to assess when considering whether
a law is longstanding? How prevalent must a law be to be considered longstanding?41
How should courts treat disparate regional traditions?42 How should courts treat laws
upheld under legal traditions inconsistent with Heller?43 Courts also have to consider
the level of generality at which to consider the conduct regulated by the challenged
law, as well as any historical regulations analogous to the challenged law.44 Using
a broader or narrower definition of the conduct and a broader or narrower view of
analogous regulations can have a dramatic impact on the outcome of a case.45 Each
of these questions is addressed in the sections below.
the constitutional text—and construction—the process that gives a text legal effect either through
translating into a legal doctrine or applying the text. See Lawrence Solum, The Interpretation-
Construction Distinction, 27 CONST.COMMENT. 95, 96 (2010). This interpretation-construction
distinction maps on neatly to the Second Amendment two-part framework, with the step one
historical analysis being the constitutional interpretation and the application of scrutiny being
the method of constitutional construction. See generally Barnett & Bernick, supra. This spe-
cific analysis has been endorsed by prominent originalists Barnett and Bernick who described
the two-step framework as “good-faith constitutional construction.” Id. at 32–36. Barnett and
Bernick state that in the Second Amendment context, “originalist interpretation” is often in-
capable of resolving “certain hard constitutional questions.” Id. at 38. As a result, courts “have
developed implementing doctrines which distinguish reasonable from unreasonable regula-
tions of firearms,” including the two-step framework. Id. at 40. Other prominent originalists
have adopted the interpretation-construction approach to originalism, or something similar,
without addressing the Second Amendment specifically. See Christopher R. Green, Originalism
and the Sense-Reference Distinction, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 555, 560 (2006) (distinguishing
between a constitutional provision’s “sense”—the meaning historically expressed by constitu-
tional language or the information constitutional text conveys—and its “reference”—the
tangible outcomes accomplished by the language; see also William Baude, Is Originalism Our
Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2355 (2015) (describing “inclusive originalism” which
allows judges to look “to precedent, policy, or practice, but only to the extent that the
original meaning incorporates or permits them”). See generally Solum, supra; Keith E.
Whittington, Constructing a New American Constitution, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 119, 120
(2010). But see ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETA-
TION OF LEGAL TEXTS 13–15 (2012) (rejecting the interpretation-construction distinction and
describing the entire endeavor as the result of an “embarrassing linguistic gaffe”). This
Article does not wade into the debate on what is and is not originalism, but focuses on the
text, history, and tradition analysis at step one.
39 See Heller I, 554 U.S. at 626–27.
40 See infra Section II.A.1.
41 See infra Section II.A.2.
42 See infra Section II.B.2.
43 See infra Section II.B.3.
44 See infra Section III.A.
45 See infra Section III.A.
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II. ANALYZING HISTORY
A. What Historical Time Period Should Be Considered When Assessing the Scope
of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms?
In Heller, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion considered historical sources, ranging
from the seventeenth century to the late nineteenth century, when analyzing the scope
of the Second Amendment.46 Since then, courts have split on exactly what laws from
what historical time periods are relevant, particularly when state laws are challenged
under the Second Amendment, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment,47
rather than a federal law subject only to the 1791 Bill of Rights.
1. The Second Amendment vs. the Fourteenth Amendment
Courts have taken three approaches to the question of whether the original public
understanding of the right to keep and bear arms should be assessed on a different
historical baseline depending on whether a challenged regulation is a federal law or
state law. The first approach treats the relevant time period for challenges to federal
and state gun laws as the founding period, essentially from the final quarter of the
eighteenth century to the early nineteenth century.48 Courts adopting this approach
have generally relied on language from Justice Alito’s plurality decision in McDonald,
which states that the “incorporated Bill of Rights protections ‘are all to be enforced
against the States under the Fourteenth Amendment according to the same standards
that protect those personal rights against federal encroachment.’”49
The most notable cases using this approach were written by Judge O’Scannlain
of the Ninth Circuit.50 O’Scannlain looked to founding-era sources in two cases addres-
sing challenges to state public carry permitting systems.51 O’Scannlain believed this
46 See generally Heller I, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
47 See generally McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (incorporating the
right against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
48 See infra Section II.A.
49 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 765 (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1963)); see also
N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525, 1541 (2020) (Alito,
J., dissenting) (pointing out that New York City provided “no evidence of laws in force
around the time of the adoption of the Second Amendment that prevented gun owners from
practicing outside city limits”); McDonald, 561 U.S. at 766 n.14 (declaring it a “well-
established rule that incorporated Bill of Rights protections apply identically to the States and
the Federal Government”).
50 See generally Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2018), reh’g en banc granted,
915 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2019) (mem.); Peruta I, 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc,
824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016).
51 See Young, 896 F.3d at 1063, 1063 n.14; Peruta I, 742 F.3d at 1155 n.5 (9th Cir. 2014).
For a more detailed look at Judge O’Scannlain’s understanding of Second Amendment history,
see generally Diarmuid O’Scannlain, Glorious Revolution to American Revolution: The
English Origin of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397 (2019).
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approach was compelled by both Justice Scalia’s Heller majority and Justice Alito’s
statement in the McDonald plurality that the Second Amendment “is fully binding on
the States” and does not provide a “watered-down, subjective version of the individual
guarantees.”52 O’Scannlain understood this language to require lower courts deciding
Second Amendment challenges to state laws to look to the 1791 understanding, stating:
Because Heller ascribed less weight to evidence from the
post–Civil War period when interpreting the Second Amendment’s
restrictions on the federal government, it necessarily follows that
the evidence is less probative when interpreting the Amendment’s
restrictions on state and local governments.53
Using the 1791 understanding of the right to keep and bear arms, O’Scannlain found
both Hawaii and California’s good-cause public carry licensing laws unconstitutional.54
O’Scannlain’s approach has been applied by several judges in the Ninth Circuit.55
Judge Posner also adopted this approach in an earlier decision striking down
Illinois’s prohibition on carrying firearms in public.56 Posner stated that “1791, the year
the Second Amendment was ratified[,] [is] the critical year for determining the [Second
A]mendment’s historical meaning, according to McDonald.”57 Like O’Scannlain,
Posner also found that history failed to justify the challenged regulations.58
The second approach, which has been adopted by a group of judges in the First,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, as well as by Justice Thomas, analyzes challenges to
state gun laws based on the understanding of the right at the time of the ratification
of the Fourteenth Amendment.59 This view was articulated in the context of the right
52 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 785–86 (plurality opinion).
53 Young, 896 F.3d 1044, 1059 n.12 (citing Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 614 (2008)); see also
Peruta I, 742 F.3d at 1155 n.5.
54 See Young, 896 F.3d at 1067–71 (finding that a statute restricting open carry only to
individuals “whose job[s] entail[] protecting life or property” destroys a core right in the
Second Amendment).
55 See Peruta I, 742 F.3d at 1155 n.5 (citing Heller I, 554 U.S. at 586, 614) (holding that
nineteenth-century judicial interpretations of the Second Amendment’s meaning are more
probative than twentieth-century interpretations); id. at 1189 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting);
Teixeira v. County of Alameda, 822 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 2016), abrogated by reh’g en
banc, 873 F.3d 670 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1988 (2018) (mem.); Teixeira v.
County of Alameda, 873 F.3d 670, 683–84 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc), aff’g No. 12-CV-03288
-WHO, 2013 WL 4804756 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2013), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1988 (2018)
(mem.); id. at 699 (Bea, J., dissenting).
56 See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012).
57 Id. at 935.
58 Id. at 935–36, 942. For Judge Posner’s views on Heller and the Second Amendment,
see Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 27, 2008), https://
newrepublic.com/article/62124/defense-looseness [https://perma.cc/4CV3-85R4].
59 See, e.g., Ezell I, 651 F.3d 684, 702–03 (7th Cir. 2011) (“McDonald confirms that when
state- or local-government action is challenged, the focus of the original-meaning inquiry is
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to keep and bear arms by Seventh Circuit Judge Sykes in a pair of decisions striking
down Chicago’s prohibition on firing ranges:
Heller suggests that some federal gun laws will survive Second
Amendment challenge because they regulate activity falling out-
side the terms of the right as publicly understood when the Bill
of Rights was ratified; McDonald confirms that if the claim con-
cerns a state or local law, the “scope” question asks how the right
was publicly understood when the Fourteenth Amendment was
proposed and ratified.60
Sykes cites to a nine-page range61 of Justice Alito’s plurality opinion in McDonald,
where the plurality looked to the period surrounding the Civil War before concluding,
“the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment counted the right to keep and
bear arms among those fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty.”62
This view was also adopted in an opinion written by Judge Selya for a unani-
mous panel of the First Circuit in Gould v. Morgan, a challenge to the enforcement
of Boston and Brookline’s public carry licensing rules.63 In Gould, Selya stated:
Because the challenge here is directed at a state law, the pertinent
point in time would be 1868 (when the Fourteenth Amendment
was ratified). . . . This date contrasts with the date of ratification
of the Second Amendment itself (1791). It is not at all clear to
us that the scope of the Second Amendment should be different
when analyzing a federal law than when analyzing a state law.64
Judge Hardiman also adopted this approach in a concurring opinion joined by four
other judges in the Third Circuit, citing Judge Sykes’s opinion.65 Sykes’s fellow Sev-
enth Circuit Judge, Judge Manion, also adopted this approach in a dissenting opinion
in a case challenging assault weapon and large capacity magazine prohibitions.66
carried forward in time; the Second Amendment’s scope as a limitation on the States depends
on how the right was understood when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.”).
60 Id. at 702 (citing Heller I, 554 U.S. at 625–28).
61 See Ezell I, 651 F.3d at 702–03.
62 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 778 (2010).
63 See 907 F.3d 659, 669 (1st Cir. 2018).
64 Id. at 669, 669 n.3.
65 See Binderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 336, 362 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Hardiman,
J., concurring) (citing Ezell I, 651 F.3d at 702) (Judge Hardiman’s concurrence was joined
by Judges Fisher, Chagares, Jordan, and Nygaard).
66 Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 414–15 (7th Cir. 2015) (Manion, J.,
dissenting) (“If the weapons are covered by the Second Amendment, we then examine
whether the asserted right (i.e., the activity affected by the regulation) is likewise covered.
424 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 29:413
Finally, Justice Thomas adopted this view in his concurring opinion in McDonald67
and in his dissent from certiorari in Rogers v. Grewal, where he relied on post-
ratification history to “inform our understanding of the right to keep and bear arms
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment as a privilege of American citizenship.”68
Notably, Justice Thomas would use this Reconstruction-Era history to clarify the
meaning of the right to bear arms as incorporated through the Privileges and Immu-
nities Clause rather than the Due Process Clause,69 but this still shows a need to look
to the scope of rights at the time of incorporation, rather than their inclusion in the
original Bill of Rights.
The focus of the second approach on 1868 makes sense for those who fully adopt
the original-public-meaning originalism applied by Justice Scalia in Heller.70 Because
the Second Amendment only applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment,71 the scope of the right incorporated should be assessed
based on the public meaning of the right to bear arms at the time of incorporation.72
This approach, however, risks the Second Amendment breaking into two different
rights, one that applies against the federal government and one that applies against
the states.73 The first approach, focusing on 1791, avoids this bifurcated Second
Amendment right. It is also supported by language in Justice Alito’s McDonald
opinion.74 However, it ignores the history surrounding the incorporation of the right
in the Fourteenth Amendment.75 While perhaps less messy, the first approach is in
To do this, we examine how the asserted right was publicly understood when the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified (or Second Amendment in the case of federal regulation) . . . .”
(citing Ezell I, 651 F.3d 684, 702 (7th Cir. 2011))).
67 See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 837–38 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
68 Rogers v. Grewal, 140 S. Ct. 1865, 1873 n.6 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (citing McDonald, 561 U.S. at 837 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment)) (arguing that the Second Amendment right to bear arms was
understood to protect public carry at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified).
69 See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 837–40 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
70 See Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 616–18 (2008).
71 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 791 (plurality opinion). Or rather, given the divide in McDonald,
four-fifths through the Due Process Clause and one-fifth through the Privileges and Immunities
Clause. See id. at 806 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
72 See Mark Anthony Frassetto, The First Congressional Debate on Public Carry and
What It Tells Us About Firearm Regionalism, 40 CAMPBELL L.REV.335, 354–55 n.115 (2018)
(discussing the debate on the relevant time period for a historical analysis).
73 See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
216–17 (1998) (discussing the difficulty of squaring the individual right to bear arms of John
Bingham, Jacob Howard, and Thaddeus Stevens with the “rather different vision of the
Second Amendment’s Anti-Federalist architects, George Mason and Elbridge Gerry”).
74 See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 761–65.
75 See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 375 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
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tension with the originalist methodology demanded by Heller, because it ignores the
original public meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.76
The third approach is best described as a “hybrid” approach. Rather than determin-
ing the scope of the right to keep and bear arms during a single historical period, judges
using the third approach look broadly to Anglo-American tradition.77 This approach
operates under the often unspoken assumption that the right remained consistent, or
at least consistent enough, during the assessed historical periods to make conclusions
about the scope of the right applicable to both the 1791 founding period and the
1868 Fourteenth Amendment period.78 The approach has the advantage of providing
a much larger body of regulation and court opinions to draw from when assessing
the scope of the right at both the federal and state level and avoiding potential dis-
parities between the founding-era and Reconstruction-Era understandings of the right
to bear arms. Rather than drawing solely from the sparse founding-era tradition and
its difficult-to-parse English common law sources, the hybrid approach allows the
inclusion of more modern case law and statutory regimes. Its wide-ranging approach
to history can also draw some support from Heller, which incorporated historical
sources spanning more than two centuries to come to its conclusion.79
Michael D. Ramsey, Beyond the Text: Justice Scalia’s Originalism in Practice, 92 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1945, 1967–68 (2017).
76 See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 375 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I doubt that the Fourteenth
Amendment time-warped the post–Civil War States back to the Revolution.”); Ramsey,
supra note 75, at 1967–69 (discussing Justice Scalia’s apparently contradictory opinions on
this issue); see also Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The
Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ.ST. L.J. 1085, 1099–1100 (1995) (discussing
whether the 1868 understanding of the Establishment Clause should be controlling in Es-
tablishment Clause cases).
77 See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives,
700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012); Peruta II, 824 F.3d 919, 929–33 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc),
cert. denied, (Peruta III), 137 S. Ct. 1995 (2017); Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d
650, 658 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir.
2012); United States v. Rene E., 583 F.3d 8, 11–12, 15–16 (1st Cir. 2009) (“The cases cited
above evidence a view, from at least the Civil War period, that regulating juvenile access to
handguns was permissible on public safety grounds and did not offend constitutional guarantees
of the right to keep and bear arms. There is some evidence that the founding generation would
have shared the view that public-safety-based limitations of juvenile possession of firearms
were consistent with the right to keep and bear arms.”); Duncan v. Becerra, 970 F.3d 1133,
1150 (9th Cir. 2020) (“In our circuit, we have looked for evidence showing whether the
challenged law traces its lineage to founding-era or Reconstruction-era regulations.”).
78 See Peruta II, 824 F.3d at 929 (“As will be seen, the history relevant to both the
Second Amendment and its incorporation by the Fourteenth Amendment lead to the same
conclusion . . . .”); see also Lash, supra note 76, at 1099–1100 (discussing the problems with
this assumption in the context of the Establishment Clause).
79 See Mark Anthony Frassetto, The Use and Misuse of History in Second Amendment
Litigation, in A RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS? THE CONTESTED ROLE OF HISTORY IN CONTEMPO-
RARY DEBATES ON THE SECOND AMENDMENT 206 (Jennifer Tucker, Barton C. Hacker &
Margaret Vining eds., 2019).
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The Supreme Court’s originalist bloc—Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, and
Kavanaugh—has expressed some approval for this hybrid approach. In a dissent
from denial in a case challenging San Diego County’s public carry licensing standard,
Justices Thomas and Gorsuch described “[t]he relevant history” as “cases and second-
ary sources from England, the founding era, the antebellum period, and Reconstruc-
tion.”80 While a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, Justice Kavanaugh adopted a view that looked both to “historical
justifications”81 and “tradition (that is post-ratification history)” as a “critical tool of
constitutional interpretation” in a Second Amendment case.82 While that case in-
volved the Second Amendment, rather than the Second Amendment as incorporated
through the Fourteenth Amendment, Kavanaugh made clear that the Supreme Court
has consistently looked to post-ratification history and tradition to determine the
scope of rights.83
The hybrid approach, while correcting some problems with the other approaches,
has two significant problems of its own—one methodological and one practical. The
methodological issue is that drawing from such a broad range of history is poten-
tially inconsistent with Heller, which declared, “Constitutional rights are enshrined
with the scope they were understood to have when the people adopted them,” a concept
known as the fixation thesis which is central in originalist scholarship.84 In other words,
using such a broad array of historical sources is inconsistent with the idea that the
Second Amendment had a single, fixed meaning at the time of its ratification. The prac-
tical flaw is that bringing in a broader array of historical sources raises the inevita-
bility that some of the sources will be inconsistent, allowing for the discretion of
judges to replace the objectivity that an originalist approach is intended to produce.85
That being said, courts would also be putting a thumb on the scale by ignoring
relevant historical materials, which could justify the constitutionality of duly enacted
laws. This type of methodological decision, especially one limiting the consideration
80 Peruta III, 137 S. Ct. 1995, 1998 (2017) (Thomas, J. dissenting from denial of certiorari).
81 Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (quoting
Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008)).
82 Id. (quoting Heller I, 554 U.S. at 635).
83 Id. at 1274 n.6.
84 Heller I, 554 U.S. at 634–35. See generally Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis:
The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2015).
85 For a stark example, compare An Act for the Better Security of the Inhabitants by Obliging
the Male White Persons to Carry Fire Arms to Places of Public Worship, 1770, reprinted in
1775–1770 GA. COLONIAL LAWS 471 (1932) (requiring “every male white inhabitant of this
province” to “carry with him a gun, or a pair of pistols, in good order and fit for service”
when attending church or another place of worship), with An Act to Preserve the Peace and
Harmony of the People of this State § 1, 1870 Ga. Laws 421 (prohibiting a person to “carry
about his person any dirk, bowie-knife, pistol or revolver, or any other kind of deadly weapon,
to any court of justice, or any election ground or precinct, or any place of public worship, or
any other public gathering in this State”).
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of scope to solely the founding period, would ignore large portions of the American
legal tradition when deciding Second Amendment cases. In this way, the hybrid ap-
proach’s practical flaw is also its biggest advantage, allowing courts to draw in a
broader range of historical materials in order to generate more conclusive answers.
2. How Old Do Laws Have to Be to Be Longstanding?
In performing the step one analysis, courts must also decide how old a regula-
tory tradition has to be to make it “longstanding” and thus presumptively lawful.86
This analysis arises from the safe harbor provisions in Heller, which state, in part:
[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on long-
standing prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and
the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in
sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or
laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial
sale of arms.87
Scalia’s opinion then goes on to explain that the “presumptively lawful regulatory
measures” in this list were only “examples” and the list does not “purport to be
exhaustive.”88 Many circuit courts have combined these two sections of Heller to
create a step one test that establishes a presumption of constitutionality for long-
standing regulations.89
But this test requires a difficult threshold question: how long ago must a regulation
have first been enacted for the court to consider it longstanding?90 The answer to this
question is, in many cases, decisive in determining whether or not a gun regulation
is inconsistent with the Second Amendment. During the founding period, laws existed
regulating the carrying and discharge of firearms in public, the storage of gunpowder,
and training mandates tied to service in the militia, but the modern firearms regulatory
framework did not develop until the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.91
By that point, the administrative state had developed sufficiently to make regulations
such as licensing, registration, and background checks realistic to implement, and
86 See Heller I, 554 U.S. at 626–27.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 627 n.26.
89 See, e.g., Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 433 (3d Cir. 2013); Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244,
1253 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
90 For an earlier effort to analyze this question, see Eric Ruben & Joseph Blocher, supra
note 5, at 1491–92.
91 For an overview of the development of American gun laws, see generally Robert J.
Spitzer, Gun Law History in the United States and Second Amendment Rights, 80 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS., 2017, at 55.
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technology had developed sufficiently such that it made sense to regulate different
kinds of firearms.92
The Supreme Court already answered part of this question in Heller, making
clear that the historical analysis does not end on the day the Second Amendment (or
Fourteenth Amendment) was ratified.93 In Heller, the Court looked to “Postenactment
legislative history,” that is, an “examination of a variety of legal and other sources to
determine the public understanding of a legal text in the period after its enactment or
ratification.”94 Justice Scalia’s opinion in Heller looked well beyond the period imme-
diately preceding ratification of the Second Amendment and included an analysis of
historical materials “through the end of the 19th century.”95 Justice Scalia’s opinion also
refers to laws that were first enacted in the early twentieth century as “longstanding
prohibitions.”96 Given that under Heller itself, the longstanding period need not go
back to ratification, it leaves open the question of what exactly the time period is.97
While often not explicit about the answer, courts have generally split across two
conclusions: setting the cutoff at either the tail end of the nineteenth century or the
first third of the twentieth century.98 While this roughly thirty-year difference might
seem small when considering the long run of Anglo-American legal history, many
modern firearms regulations were enacted during the period of disagreement, so this
thirty-year timespan has a real impact on how cases are decided.99
The Third Circuit has adopted the view that laws enacted in the early twentieth
century are longstanding.100 In a 2013 decision, the court found that a public carry law
that “existed in New Jersey in some form for nearly 90 years” was sufficiently
92 See id. For a case study on the transition to modern firearms regulation, see generally
Frassetto, supra note 72, at 335.
93 See Heller I, 554 U.S. at 605.
94 Id. (emphasis added).
95 Id.
96 Id. at 626.
97 A small number of judges have rejected this analysis, instead demanding that laws
precisely mirror those of the founding. See Mance v. Sessions, 896 F.3d 699, 714 (5th Cir.
2018) (en banc) (Owen, J., concurring) (“In the present case, the Government has offered no
evidence that an in-state sales requirement has a founding-era analogue or was historically
understood to be within the ambit of the permissible regulation of commercial sales of
firearms at the time the Bill of Rights was ratified.”); see also United States v. McCane, 573
F.3d 1037, 1048 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich, J., concurring) (“But more recent authorities
have not found evidence of longstanding [felon] dispossession laws. . . . Instead they assert,
the weight of historical evidence suggests felon dispossession laws are creatures of the
twentieth—rather than the eighteenth—century. . . . Together these authorities cast doubt on
a categorical approach to felon dispossession laws.” (citations omitted)).
98 Compare Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 433–34 (3d Cir. 2013), with id. at 450
(Hardiman, J., dissenting).
99 See generally Repository of Historical Gun Laws, DUKE CTR. FOR FIREARMS LAW,
https://law.duke.edu/gunlaws/ [https://perma.cc/4HRP-KSCL] (last visited Dec. 8, 2020)
(database containing a substantial repository of historical firearms laws).
100 Drake, 724 F.3d at 432, 434.
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longstanding to be presumptively lawful.101 Similarly, the D.C. Circuit found handgun
registration laws first enacted in the early twentieth century were “deeply enough
rooted in our history to support the presumption that a registration requirement is
constitutional.”102 The D.C. Circuit justified its decision by noting that the Heller Court
considered laws prohibiting the possession of firearms by felons to be longstanding,
“although states did not start to enact them until the early 20th century,” and at “about
the same time, states and localities began to require registration of handguns.”103
This view was also adopted by the Fifth Circuit, which found that early twentieth
century laws should be considered longstanding because “Heller demonstrates that a
regulation can be deemed ‘longstanding’ even if it cannot boast a precise founding-
era analogue. . . . After all, Heller considered firearm possession bans on felons and
the mentally ill to be longstanding, yet the current versions of these bans are of mid-
20th century vintage.”104 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit noted, “early twentieth century
regulations might . . . demonstrate a history of longstanding regulation if their
historical prevalence and significance is properly developed in the record.”105 Judge
Clifton of the Ninth Circuit noted in a dissenting opinion: “Numerous states adopted
good cause limitations on public carry in the early 20th century. Laws from this time
period may also be considered ‘longstanding’ under Heller.”106
Other judges have expressed more skepticism about twentieth-century laws being
longstanding for purposes of understanding rights prior to that time but have none-
theless found such laws longstanding. The Seventh Circuit, while noting that “we
do take from Heller the message that exclusions need not mirror limits that were on
the books in 1791,”107 described it as “weird to say” that a law enacted in the 1990s
is unconstitutional in the 2010s, “but will become constitutional” when it becomes
“longstanding” in the 2040s.108 Similarly, in Binderup v. Attorney General, Judge
101 Id.
102 Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (relying on the Heller I majority’s
statement that other early-twentieth-century laws were longstanding).
103 Id. (citing Marshall, supra note 32, at 708).
104 Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700
F.3d 185, 196 (5th Cir. 2012); see also United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir.
2010); Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1211 (10th Cir. 2013) (“Heller demonstrates
that a regulation can be deemed ‘longstanding’ even if it cannot boast a precise founding-era
analogue . . . . Heller considered firearm possession bans on felons and the mentally ill to be
longstanding, yet the current versions of these bans are of mid-20th century vintage.”
(alteration in original)).
105 Fyock v. City of Sunnyvale, 779 F.3d 991, 997 (9th Cir. 2015).
106 Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1079 (9th Cir. 2018) (Clifton, J., dissenting) reh’g
en banc granted, 915 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2019) (mem.).
107 Skoien, 614 F.3d at 641; see also Binderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 336, 351 (3d Cir.
2016) (en banc).
108 Skoien, 614 F.3d at 641; see also Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406,
408 (7th Cir. 2015) (“From the perspective of 2008, when Heller was decided, laws dating
to the 1920s may seem to belong to a ‘historical tradition’ of regulation. But they were enacted
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Fuentes joined by six of his colleagues in the Third Circuit noted the disagreement
among courts about whether a law in effect for “50 years is a long enough period of
time to entrench a constitutional tradition” but went on to find that the “categorical
ban on felons possessing firearms is rooted deeply enough in our tradition to operate
as a bona fide disqualification from the Second Amendment right.”109
Other courts and judges have read Heller’s language in a more restrictive manner.
Judge Hardiman, for example, rejected a Third Circuit panel majority’s view that the
Heller Court’s inclusion of laws first passed in the twentieth century meant that other
laws enacted during the same period were similarly longstanding.110 Hardiman
instead tied the language of Heller to founding-era “[d]ebates from the Pennsylvania,
Massachusetts, and New Hampshire ratifying conventions, which . . . confirm that
the common law right to keep and bear arms did not extend to those who were likely
to commit violent offenses.”111 Judge Hardiman left unexplained how eighteenth-
century debates qualified as either “longstanding” regulations or “prohibitions on
the possession of firearms by felons.”112
Similarly, a Ninth Circuit panel found that a law passed in 1938 “did not represent
a ‘longstanding’ prohibition.”113 And a per curiam decision from a Fifth Circuit panel
“assume[d], without deciding,” that “‘these early twentieth century state residency
restrictions’ . . . . are not ‘presumptively lawful regulatory measures.’”114
At least two prominent conservative judges advocate for a far more extreme ap-
proach, one that seems to go against the language of Heller, and would not consider any
law enacted after the founding period “longstanding.” Judge Owen of the Fifth Circuit
would require “a founding era analogue” or evidence that the challenged regulation was
“within the ambit of the permissible regulation of commercial sales of firearms at
more than 130 years after the states ratified the Second Amendment. Why should regulations
enacted 130 years after the Second Amendment’s adoption (and nearly 60 years after the
Fourteenth’s) have more validity than those enacted another 90 years later? Nothing in Heller
suggests that a constitutional challenge to bans on private possession of machine guns brought
during the 1930s, soon after their enactment, should have succeeded—that the passage of
time creates an easement across the Second Amendment. If Highland Park’s ordinance stays
on the books for a few years, that shouldn’t make it either more or less open to challenge
under the Second Amendment.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
109 836 F.3d at 391 (Fuentes, J., dissenting).
110 See Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 448–49 (3d Cir. 2013) (Hardiman, J., dissenting).
111 Id. at 450 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 173
(2011)). Hardiman took the same approach in his concurrence in Binderup v. Attorney General,
836 F.3d at 361–62 (Hardiman, J., concurring).
112 See Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
113 Teixeira v. County of Alameda, 822 F.3d 1047, 1057 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing United States
v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1137 (9th Cir. 2013)), abrogated by reh’g en banc, 873 F.3d 670
(9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1988 (2018) (mem.).
114 Mance v. Sessions, 896 F.3d 699, 704 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (first quoting Mance
v. Holder, 74 F. Supp. 3d 795, 805 (N.D. Tex. 2015); and then quoting McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010) (plurality opinion)).
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the time the Bill of Rights was ratified” in order for it to be “longstanding.”115 In the
same vein, Judge Tymkovich of the Tenth Circuit stated that because “felon dispos-
session laws are creatures of the twentieth—rather than the eighteenth—century,”
doubt should be cast “on a categorical approach to felon dispossession laws.”116
While courts have disagreed about the proper timing for considering a law
longstanding at step one of the Second Amendment framework, the methodology
most consistent with Heller would place the line in the early twentieth century. This
methodology has practical benefits, too. Considering history from a period faced with
public safety threats more similar to those in the present day—gun violence due to
prohibition committed using modern firearms—makes an originalist approach more
useful when deciding current controversies. Further, to the extent historical evidence
from a more relevant period is absent or ambiguous, the early-twentieth-century
tradition is the best historical evidence available to clarify the historical scope of
regulation and decide Second Amendment cases on originalist grounds.
B. Prevalence, Regional Variation, and Alternative Legal Traditions
Courts have encountered three additional historical issues in the step one analysis.
The most prominent of these issues is how prevalent a historical tradition must be
to place an analogous contemporary regulation either (1) outside of the scope of the
Second Amendment and, therefore, lawful, or (2) to qualify the regulation as long-
standing and, therefore, also presumptively lawful.117 In a federal system like the
United States, regulatory unanimity is virtually unheard of, so a prevalence standard
of something other than one hundred percent is necessary.118 Another issue is how to
determine whether a regionally significant regulatory tradition is sufficiently promi-
nent to place a regulation outside the scope of the Second Amendment. The last issue
is whether and how to incorporate into the Second Amendment analysis historical legal
and regulatory traditions adopted and upheld based on an interpretation of the
Second Amendment that is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller.
1. How Prevalent Must a Regulatory Tradition Be to Fall Outside the Scope of
the Second Amendment or Be Considered Longstanding?
An open question courts grapple with in Second Amendment litigation is how
widespread a historical regulatory tradition must be to be considered presumptively
lawful. Heller provides a partial answer to this question.119 In Heller, the Court
115 Id. at 713–14 (Owen, J., concurring).
116 United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1048 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich, J.,
dissenting).
117 See, e.g., Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explo-
sives, 700 F.3d 185, 194–95 (5th Cir. 2012) (describing the first prong of analysis under
Heller I).
118 See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 135.
119 See generally Heller I, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
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rejected the idea that a 1783 Boston ordinance, which prohibited bringing loaded
firearms into a dwelling-house, established a tradition of such regulations, stating, “we
would not stake our interpretation of the Second Amendment upon a single law, in
effect in a single city, that contradicts the overwhelming weight of other evidence re-
garding the right to keep and bear arms for defense of the home.”120 This portion of
Heller instructs courts that a single ordinance in one city is not enough, at least when
it “contradicts the overwhelming weight of other evidence.”121 Yet Heller also estab-
lished that unanimity is not required.122 Justice Scalia rejected the idea that “different
people of the founding period had vastly different conceptions of the right to keep and
bear arms,” because “the Bill of Rights codified venerable, widely understood liber-
ties.”123 So if a number of states enacted a provision it would show that the regulated
conduct was not widely understood to be within the right’s scope.124 Heller, therefore,
leaves open the question of precisely how many state laws or local ordinances need to
exist to establish the presumptive legality of an analogous contemporary regulation.
While this question is a critical part of the step one analysis, it has garnered scant
attention from the circuit courts. Most frequently, when the historical record is mixed
as to whether a regulatory tradition is prevalent or not, courts skip the step one anal-
ysis and go straight to the step two analysis of applying tiers of constitutional scru-
tiny.125 When courts have considered this issue, unsurprisingly, they have not agreed
on what number of state laws or local ordinances are necessary to make a law long-
standing or outside the scope of the Second Amendment.126 Judge Sykes of the Seventh
Circuit said that “if the historical evidence is inconclusive or suggests that the regu-
lated activity is not categorically unprotected—then there must be a second inquiry into
the strength of the government’s justification for restricting or regulating the exercise
of Second Amendment rights.”127 Judge Williams of the Seventh Circuit took a
120 Id. at 631–32 (discussing Act of Mar. 1, 1783, ch. XIII).
121 Id. at 632.
122 Id. at 604–05.
123 Id. The accuracy of this claim is called into question by the founding-era debate around
the constitutionality of the Sedition Acts. See generally Jud Campbell, The Invention of First
Amendment Federalism, 97 TEX. L. REV. 517 (2019).
124 See Heller I, 554 U.S. at 604–05.
125 See, e.g., Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting
that “[w]hat history demonstrates is that states often disagreed as to the scope of the right to
bear arms” before moving onto step two); see also Ruben & Blocher, supra note 5, at 1493
(finding that seventy-three percent of courts do not analyze historical sources in Second
Amendment cases).
126 Compare, e.g., Ezell I, 651 F.3d 684, 703 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that inconclusive
historical evidence of an activity’s protected status demands a step two analysis), with id. at
713–14 (Rovner, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the inconclusive evidence requires
acknowledgment of a more limited Second Amendment scope), and Moore v. Madigan, 702
F.3d 933, 947 (7th Cir. 2011) (Williams, J., dissenting) (suggesting that ambiguous historical
evidence of an activity’s protected status is “step one of the analysis”).
127 Ezell I, 651 F.3d at 703.
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different view in a dissent from a different opinion striking down an Illinois prohibition
on carrying handguns in public.128 Williams wrote that if the history was “ambiguous,”
“then it does not seem there was ‘a venerable, widely understood’ right.”129
While not yet widely addressed, this is a question courts will have to grapple
with as history remains an important part of the Second Amendment analysis. Heller
provides guidance for how the lower federal courts should move forward, but a more
coherent Second Amendment analysis will require a more precise approach. Judge
Williams’s approach seems the most methodologically sound—to the extent incon-
sistencies exist in a regulatory tradition, those inconsistencies undermine the notion
that a right was widely understood.130
2. How Are Inconsistent Regional Traditions Treated?
Another critical question is how courts should handle distinct regional historical
regulatory traditions when conducting the step one analysis. As in the present day, his-
torically, gun laws were substantially less stringent in the American South, espe-
cially during the Antebellum period.131 For example, while many Southern states
allowed the carrying of firearms in public if the weapons were carried in an open
rather than concealed manner, many states in the North completely prohibited the
carrying of weapons in public absent an immediate need for self-defense.132 Corre-
spondingly, in several Southern states, courts gave the right to keep and bear arms
broader effect than in Northern states—although they still viewed the right substan-
tially more narrowly than argued for by present-day gun rights advocates.133 After
the Civil War, several Western states developed a unique regulatory tradition in which
the carrying of arms was unlimited in rural and frontier areas, but completely pro-
hibited in cities and towns, and especially sanctioned in places of public gathering such
as schools, markets, and dance halls.134 There was also variation at the local level,
128 Moore, 702 F.3d at 947 (Williams, J., dissenting).
129 Id.
130 See id.
131 See Eric M. Ruben & Saul Cornell, Firearm Regionalism and Public Carry: Placing
Southern Antebellum Case Law in Context, 125 YALE L.J.F. 121, 124–28 (2015); see also
Frassetto, supra note 72, at 354–55 (describing historical regional variation in public carry
regulation).
132 Ruben & Cornell, supra note 131, at 127, 130–33.
133 Compare, e.g., Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90 (1822) (striking down a
Kentucky law prohibiting concealed carry), and Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. (1 Kelly) 243, 245 (1846)
(striking down a Georgia law prohibiting open carry), with Ruben & Cornell, supra note 131, at
131 n.53 (“In light of the fact that restrictions on public carry were well accepted in places
like Massachusetts and were included in the relevant manual for justices of the peace, the
[correct] inference is that violations were enforced at the justice of peace level, but did not
result in expensive appeals that would have produced searchable case law.” (citations omitted)).
134 See, e.g., Act of Feb. 2, 1860, 1860 N.M. Laws 94 (prohibiting public carry of deadly
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as many cities across the country completely prohibited the carrying of firearms,
while others banned carrying concealed weapons and remained silent on open carry.135
This means that when assessing the constitutionality of gun laws under the
Second Amendment, the historical record will sometimes pull in more than one
direction based on the region and time period examined.136 How these historical
traditions are prioritized could often prove critical in deciding Second Amendment
cases. Courts and scholars, however, have thus far generally overlooked this issue,
with all of the discussion coming in cases challenging state public carry laws.137
As with the prevalence analysis discussed above, most frequently, when regula-
tory traditions are regionally inconsistent, courts punt on the step one analysis.138
The Second Circuit, for example, noted that regional differences caution the court
against making broad pronouncements about the scope of the right to keep and bear
arms, stating: “History and tradition do not speak with one voice here. What history
weapons except in travel between towns and providing for increased minimum and maximum
fines for public carry in public assemblies); Act of Dec. 2, 1876, ch. 52, § 1, 1876 Wyo. Sess.
Laws 352 (prohibiting public carry of deadly weapons within cities, towns, and villages); Act
of Mar. 4, 1881, ch. 37, § 23, 1881 Kan. Sess. Laws 92 (requiring all cities with populations
exceeding fifteen thousand inhabitants to prohibit public carry of dangerous or deadly
weapons); Act of Mar. 18, 1889, no. 13, 1889 Ariz. Sess. Laws 30 (prohibiting public carry
of certain weapons within settlements, towns, villages, and cities except in cases of persons
traveling or facing certain danger and providing for increased minimum and maximum fines
for public carry in public assemblies); Act of Feb. 4, 1889, 1889, § 1, Idaho Laws 23 (prohib-
iting public carry of deadly weapons in cities, towns, villages, and public assemblies).
135 See, e.g., L.A., CAL., ORDINANCE 35–36 (1878) (complete prohibition); NASHVILLE,
TENN., ORDINANCE ch. 108 (Dec. 26, 1873) (complete prohibition); SUPERIOR, WIS., ORDI-
NANCE no. 286, § 18 (Nov. 25, 1896) (concealed weapons). While legally this distinction is
significant, in practical effect, all would have functioned in a similar manner prohibiting the
public carrying of firearms in the vast majority of circumstances. There is little evidence that
carrying firearms openly was common during the antebellum period and what evidence does
exist indicates that it was extremely rare to non-existent. See State v. Huntly, 25 N.C. (3
Ired.) 418, 422 (1843) (per curiam) (“A gun is an ‘unusual weapon,’ wherewith to be armed and
clad. No man amongst us carries it about with him, as one of his every-day accoutrements—as
a part of his dress—and never, we trust, will the day come when any deadly weapon will be
worn or wielded in our peace-loving and law-abiding State . . . .”); State v. Smith, 11 La. Ann.
633, 634 (1856) (describing openly carrying a handgun as “the extremely unusual case of the
carrying of such weapon in full open view, and partially covered by the pocket or clothes”).
136 See supra text accompanying notes 31–34.
137 This is unsurprising as the argument largely did not exist until the publication of an
excellent article by Professors Eric Ruben and Saul Cornell in the Yale Law Journal Forum
arguing that during the antebellum period Northern and Southern states had radically
different gun laws and views on firearms rights. Ruben & Cornell, supra note 131. For a
discussion on similar constitutional implications of the historical urban-rural divide in gun
regulation, see Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82 (2013).
138 See, e.g., Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 2012); Gould
v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 669 (1st Cir. 2018).
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demonstrates is that states often disagreed as to the scope of the right to bear arms,
whether the right was embodied in a state constitution or the Second Amendment.”139
The First Circuit took a similar course, stating: “After a diligent search for the
answer to this question, we find . . . that there is no national consensus, rooted in
history, concerning the right to public carriage of firearms.”140 Judge Selya’s majority
opinion rejected relying on the traditions of one region—the South—noting that
“[c]ourts that have found the history conclusive relied primarily on historical data
derived from the antebellum South.”141 The majority found it “unconvincing to argue
that practices in one region of the country reflect the existence of a national consen-
sus about the implications of the Second Amendment for public carriage of firearms.”142
When viewed through “a wider angled lens,” the history “tells a different tale . . . that
‘states and their predecessor colonies and territories have taken divergent approaches
to the regulation of firearms.’”143 The court went on to find that because “the national
historical inquiry does not dictate an answer,” it was appropriate to assume the right
to bear arms was implicated and apply scrutiny, rather than attempt to glean answers
from the historical record.144
The most in-depth debate on this issue appeared in the Ninth Circuit’s now-
vacated decision in Young v. Hawaii, a 2–1 decision in which the majority found
Hawaii’s open carry licensing system unconstitutional.145 In a dissent, Judge Clifton
chastised the majority for its conclusion that historical sources “reveal a single Ameri-
can voice,”146 noting that the majority’s historical analysis “focus[ed] solely on the
laws and decisions from one region, the antebellum South.”147 Clifton noted that “the
jurisdictions relied upon by the majority opinion, . . . Kentucky, Tennessee, Ala-
bama, Georgia, and Louisiana[,] . . . were all slave states, and the decisions relied
upon by the majority opinion all date from before the Civil War.”148 Like the First
Circuit, Clifton argued: “To suggest that the approach of the antebellum South re-
flected a national consensus about the Second Amendment’s implications for public
carry of firearms is misguided” and “there was no single voice on this question, as
there is not today.”149 The majority rejected the critique, stating, “we cannot agree
139 Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 91; see also Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 431 (3d Cir. 2013)
(quoting Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 91).
140 Gould, 907 F.3d at 669.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 669–70 (quoting Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1076, 1078 (9th Cir. 2018)
(Clifton, J., dissenting), reh’g en banc granted, 915 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2019) (mem.)).
144 Gould, 907 F.3d at 670.
145 See 896 F.3d 1044.
146 Id. at 1080 (Clifton, J., dissenting).
147 Id. at 1076.
148 Id. at 1076.
149 Id. at 1077, 1080.
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with the dissent’s choice to cast aside Southern cases [because] Heller placed great
emphasis on cases from the South.”150
The Young majority’s historical analysis is misguided for two reasons. First, as
discussed above, Justice Scalia’s decision in Heller states that the Second Amend-
ment codified “widely understood liberties,” so to the extent that regional traditions
show at least one region of the United States did not extend the right to bear arms to
particular regulated conduct, that provides strong evidence that the Second Amend-
ment does not protect that conduct.151 Second, at least in the Fourteenth Amendment
context, to the extent one regional tradition should be given more weight, it should
be the Northern tradition.152 Northern Republicans drafted the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and were the primary force behind its ratification, and Northern states made
up nineteen of the twenty-seven states necessary for ratification.153 Even if one
rejects the idea that Northern views should predominate when analyzing the Four-
teenth Amendment, it would seem incongruous, given the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s drafting and ratification, to use the Second Amendment to impose the
Antebellum Southern view of a constitutional right across the nation.154
3. What Impact Do Historical Legal Traditions Inconsistent with Heller Have on
the Second Amendment Analysis?
Another issue that has arisen with the step one analysis is how to treat Nine-
teenth Century cases that analyzed the Second Amendment, or the analogous state right
to bear arms provisions, as rights tied to militia service rather than a purely individual
right. Speaking in fairly general terms, there are three historical legal views of con-
stitutional right to arms provisions155: the individual rights view adopted by Heller,156
an individual right to possess arms in order to facilitate militia service,157 and a
150 Id. at 1057 n.9 (majority opinion).
151 See Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 605 (2008).
152 See Christopher R. Green, Loyal Denominatorism and the Fourteenth Amendment:
Normative Defense and Implications, 13 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 167, 205 (2017)
(“[T]he text of the Amendment should be read through the lens of Northern views of equality,
due process, and the privileges of citizens, not as if the Amendment was genuinely co-
authored by the South.”).
153 See Frassetto, supra note 72, at 357.
154 See Green, supra note 152, at 205 n.167 (noting that there were “a few Republicans who
described the Fourteenth Amendment as the export of Northern civil liberties to the South”).
155 See generally Michael P. O’Shea, Modeling the Second Amendment Right to Carry Arms
(I): Judicial Tradition and the Scope of “Bearing Arms” for Self-Defense, 61 AM.U.L.REV. 585
(2011) (discussing defense, hybrid, and collective interpretations of the Second Amendment).
156 See Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90 (1822).
157 See generally, e.g., Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165 (1871); English v. State,
35 Tex. 473 (1871).
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collective right to a militia.158 In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, many state
supreme courts interpreted right to bear arms provisions using the latter two catego-
ries, and upheld gun laws with this understanding.159 These traditions are plainly
inconsistent with the result in Heller. If Second Amendment cases involved an
ordinary common-law-style case law analysis that builds on precedent, these traditions
would be irrelevant going forward; however, because the step one analysis seeks to
determine the original public understanding of the scope of the right to bear arms, then
these cases still matter. Regardless of the means by which a gun regulation is upheld,
that case still provides evidence of the public understanding of the right to bear arms
during the relevant historical period.160
Thus far, this issue has been most relevant in the public carry context because of
the relatively large number of nineteenth-century public carry cases applying militia-
related approaches. The most extensive discussion of the issue appears in a series of
public carry decisions issued by Judge O’Scannlain of the Ninth Circuit, who rejects
the relevance of these cases.161 For example, in a majority opinion in Peruta v.
County of San Diego, Judge O’Scannlain put this concept in Orwellian terms: “We
set out to review the bulk of precedents from this period. All are, in a broad sense,
equally relevant, for every historical gloss on the phrase ‘bear arms’ furnishes a clue
of that phrase’s original or customary meaning. Still, some cases are more equal
than others.”162
Judge O’Scannlain went on to determine that historical cases that did not recognize
an individual right to bear arms had little evidentiary value when assessing the scope
of the Second Amendment.163 The Supreme Court denied a writ of certiorari in the
Peruta case, but in a dissent from its denial, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch,
broadly agreed with Judge O’Scannlain’s historical analysis, stating: “The panel opin-
ion below pointed to a wealth of cases and secondary sources from England, the found-
ing era, the antebellum period, and Reconstruction, which together strongly suggest
that the right to bear arms includes the right to bear arms in public in some manner.”164
Judge O’Scannlain took a similar approach in Young v. Hawaii, rejecting the
relevance of nineteenth-century cases that did not recognize state and federal right
158 See generally, e.g., Walburn v. Territory, 59 P. 972 (Okla. 1899); State v. Buzzard, 4
Ark. 19 (1842); City of Salina v. Blaksley, 83 P. 619 (1905).
159 See, e.g., Andrews, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) at 165; English, 35 Tex. at 473; Walburn, 59
P. at 972; Buzzard, 4 Ark. at 18; City of Salina, 83 P. at 619.
160 See supra text accompanying notes 11–16, 31–33.
161 See generally, e.g., Peruta I, 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc, 824 F.3d
919 (9th Cir. 2016); Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2018), reh’g en banc granted,
915 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2019) (mem.).
162 Peruta I, 742 F.3d at 1155.
163 Id. at 1156; see also Peruta II, 824 F.3d at 954 n.7 (Callahan, J., dissenting) (“Some
authorities are unpersuasive as they rely on a pre-Heller interpretation of the Second Amendment
as being limited to a right to bear arms for purposes of maintaining a ‘well-regulated’ militia.”).
164 Peruta III, 137 S. Ct. 1995, 1998 (2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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to bear arms provisions as protecting an individual right.165 O’Scannlain specifically
identified State v. Buzzard, an 1842 Arkansas Supreme Court case upholding a state
public carry law because the state constitution did not protect an individual right to
bear arms,166 stating that “with Heller on the books, cases in Buzzard’s flock furnish
us with little instructive value.”167
Other courts have relied on the line of militia-based right cases without discuss-
ing whether their inconsistency with Heller undermines their usefulness in the step
one analysis.168 That said, because those courts relied on these cases, they presum-
ably rejected the view that they are less relevant.169
While the case law on this issue is limited, Judge O’Scannlain’s opinions point
in a troubling direction, which runs contrary to the original public understanding
analysis adopted in Heller.170 Original public understanding originalism instructs
courts to analyze the original public understanding of the right protected by the Second
Amendment.171 Judge O’Scannlain leaves unanswered the question of why being
inconsistent with Heller would make a historical case any less instructive of the
original public understanding of the Second Amendment and its state analogues.172
Surely a twenty-first-century case cannot change the nineteenth-century understand-
ing of the scope of the right. And, while it is fine to reject those nineteenth-century
understandings (we do not take the Sedition Acts as guidance about the scope of the
First Amendment), it is not fine to declare fealty to a strictly historical test and then
artificially narrow one’s field of vision with regard to that history—especially if
history plays a singular role in constitutional decision-making. That said, how to
treat cases adopting methodologies different from Heller is an open question, which
future courts deciding Second Amendment cases will need to answer.
III. DECIDING THE LEVEL OF GENERALITY
A. The Level of Generality Courts Use to Define the Right to Bear Arms
One major question in most Second Amendment cases is at what level of
generality to analyze the right to keep and bear arms. That is, should the court assess
the scope of the right at a high level of generality or based on the particular circum-
stances of the case? For example, the results of a historical analysis in a challenge
165 Young, 896 F.3d at 1057.
166 See State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18, 18–30 (1842).
167 Young, 896 F.3d at 1057.
168 See, e.g., Peruta I, 742 F.3d 1144, 1186–89 (9th Cir. 2014) (Thomas, J., dissenting),
rev’d en banc, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016); Peruta II, 824 F.3d at 933–36; Kachalsky v.
County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 90–91 (2d Cir. 2012).
169 See, e.g., Peruta I, 742 F.3d at 1186–89; Peruta II, 824 F.3d at 933–36; Kachalsky, 701
F.3d at 90–91.
170 See supra text accompanying notes 11–16, 163–67.
171 See supra text accompanying notes 11–16, 163–67.
172 See Peruta I, 742 F.3d at 1156.
2020] JUDGING HISTORY 439
to a law regulating the carrying of firearms in public might be quite different if the
question was the more general “does the Second Amendment protect some right to
possess firearms outside of the home?” as opposed to the more specific “does the
Second Amendment protect a right to carry firearms in public when a person has no
immediate need for self-defense?” A court’s choice of whether to assess the scope
of the right at a high or low level of generality could make a substantial difference in
the ultimate result of the case.173 Assessments at the higher level of generality almost
always lead to a finding that a challenged regulation impinges on the right to keep
and bear arms and generally lead to the application of either a categorical rejection
of a challenged law or the application of a more stringent form of heightened
scrutiny.174 Assessments of the right at a lower degree of generality more often lead
to laws being upheld at step one or after the application of intermediate scrutiny.175
Like many of the other methodological issues discussed in this Article, public
carry cases provide the best examples of courts taking divergent views of generality
with divergent results.176 Judges favoring a broad right to carry in public have generally
framed the question as whether the Second Amendment protects a right to carry arms
in public at all.177 For example, in a dissent from denial of certiorari in a case chal-
lenging California’s requirement that those seeking licenses to carry concealed firearms
must show good cause, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, framed the question
as, “whether [the right to keep and bear arms] protects the right to carry firearms in
public for self-defense” before indicating that the law should have been found
unconstitutional.178 This view is most thoroughly laid out by Judge Callahan of the
Ninth Circuit in her dissent from the court’s en banc decision to uphold California’s
carry licensing provisions.179 Judge Callahan wrote that “[d]efining the constitutional
173 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Prologue to ORIGINALISM AS FAITH, supra note 11, at xv
(“More generally, if the meaning of a constitutional provision is stated at any abstract enough
level, almost any result can be justified.”); Peter J. Smith, Originalism and Level of Generality,
51 GA. L. REV. 485, 487 (2017) (“The selection of the level of generality at which we ask the
question essentially foreordains the answer.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority,
59 U. CHI. L. REV. 349, 358 (1992) (explaining the importance of a “consistent theory of
choice” because “[m]ovements in the level of constitutional generality may be used to justify
almost any outcome”).
174 See infra text accompanying notes 177–84; see also Smith, supra note 173, at 487;
Easterbrook, supra note 173, at 352.
175 See infra text accompanying notes 185–91; see also Smith, supra note 173, at 487;
Easterbrook, supra note 173, at 352.
176 See infra text accompanying notes 178–91.
177 See infra text accompanying notes 178–84.
178 Peruta III, 137 S. Ct. 1995, 1996, 1999–2000 (2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari); see also Rogers v. Grewal, 140 S. Ct. 1865, 1868 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting
from the denial of certiorari) (“This case also presents the Court with an opportunity to clarify
that the Second Amendment protects a right to public carry.”).
179 See Peruta II, 824 F.3d 919, 953 (9th Cir. 2016) (Callahan, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
137 S. Ct. 1995.
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right to bear arms narrowly is inconsistent with judicial protection of other funda-
mental freedoms.”180 Judge Callahan argued that other constitutional rights were
assessed at a high level of generality.181 She noted that “the question in Obergefell was
not whether the plaintiffs have a right to same-sex marriage,” but rather, “whether the
states’ limitation of marriage to a man and woman violated the right to marry.”182
Therefore, she concluded that the question in public carry cases should not be “the right
to concealed carry per se, but their individual right to self-defense guaranteed by
Heller.”183 Judge Callahan was concerned that assessing the scope of the right at a lower
level of generality would allow “states [to] obliterate [Second Amendment rights] by
enacting incrementally more burdensome restrictions while arguing that a reviewing
court must evaluate each restriction by itself when determining its constitutionality.”184
In contrast, judges who have favored upholding public carry restrictions have
done so while characterizing questions about the Second Amendment right more
narrowly.185 The best example of this approach comes from Chief Judge Thomas of
the Ninth Circuit in a dissent from a decision striking down California’s requirement
that those seeking a concealed carry permit must show a need for self-defense greater
than the general public.186 Judge Thomas criticized the panel majority for character-
izing the question in the case as whether a citizen has a right “to carry a firearm in
public for self-defense,” stating it is “an important issue, but . . . not the question we
are called upon to answer.”187 Instead, “the proper analytic approach is to answer the
historical inquiry as to whether carrying a concealed weapon in public was under-
stood to be within the scope of the right protected by the Second Amendment at the
time of ratification.”188 Judge Thomas urged a focus on the specific question pre-
sented by the case because it “delineates the proper form of relief and clarifies the
particular Second Amendment restriction that is before us.”189 In upholding other
public carry laws, judges have focused on the specific provision challenged, e.g.,
180 Id. at 953.
181 Id. (first citing Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015); then citing Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 566–70 (2003); and then citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 485–86 (1965)) (noting examples of the Court broadly defining constitutional rights,
such as the “right to marry, not right to same-sex marriage” in Obergefell, the “right to
privacy, not right to engage in sodomy” in Lawrence, and the “right to marital privacy, not




185 See infra text accompanying notes 186–91.
186 See Peruta I, 742 F.3d 1144, 1179 (9th Cir. 2014) (Thomas, J., dissenting), rev’d en
banc, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016).
187 Id. at 1181; see also Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1209 (10th Cir. 2013)
(“[W]e first ask whether the Second Amendment provides the right to carry a concealed
firearm. We conclude that it does not.”).
188 Peruta I, 742 F.3d at 1182 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
189 Id. (quoting Peterson, 707 F.3d at 1209).
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“[d]oes New York’s handgun licensing scheme violate the Second Amendment by
requiring an applicant to demonstrate ‘proper cause’ to obtain a license to carry a
concealed handgun in public?”190 Similarly, in Gould v. Morgan, First Circuit Judge
Selya flipped the question around and asked whether “the Second Amendment
guarantees . . . an unconditional right to carry firearms in public for self-defense.”191
This divide exists in cases covering other Second Amendment questions as well.
In Ezell v. City of Chicago (Ezell I), a challenge to Chicago’s prohibition on gun ranges,
Judge Sykes criticized the district court for framing the constitutional question too
narrowly—”whether the individual’s right to possess firearms within his residence
expands to the right to train with that same firearm in a firing range located within
the [c]ity’s borders”—preferring a broader question about the right to bear arms.192
This has been the consistent approach by judges who favor striking down gun laws.193
Justice Thomas, in a dissent from denial of certiorari, joined by Justice Scalia, in a
case addressing the constitutionality of a safe storage law, zoomed the case out to
the maximum level of generality, determining that the relevant analysis involved the
190 Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 83 (2d Cir. 2012).
191 907 F.3d 659, 668 (1st Cir. 2018).
192 651 F.3d 684, 700 (7th Cir. 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Ezell v. City of
Chicago, No. 10-CV-5135, 210 WL 3998104, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2010)).
193 See Peruta I, 742 F.3d at 1147 (“We are called upon to decide whether a responsible,
law-abiding citizen has a right under the Second Amendment to carry a firearm in public for
self-defense.”); Teixeira v. County of Alameda, 822 F.3d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 2016) (“We
must decide whether the right to keep and to bear arms, as recognized by the Second Amend-
ment, necessarily includes the right of law-abiding Americans to purchase and to sell firearms.
In other words, we must determine whether the Second Amendment places any limits on
regulating the commercial sale of firearms.”) abrogated by reh’g en banc, 873 F.3d 670 (9th
Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1988 (2018) (mem.); Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864
F.3d 650, 657 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“Our first question is whether the Amendment’s ‘core’
extends to publicly carrying guns for self-defense.”); Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1048
(9th Cir. 2018) (“We must decide whether the Second Amendment encompasses the right
of a responsible law-abiding citizen to carry a firearm openly for self-defense outside of the
home.”), reh’g en banc granted, 915 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2019) (mem.); Friedman v. City of
Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 412 (7th Cir. 2015) (Manion, J., dissenting) (“By prohibiting
a class of weapons commonly used throughout the country, Highland Park’s ordinance in-
fringes upon the rights of its citizens to keep weapons in their homes for the purpose of
defending themselves, their families, and their property.”); Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d 160,
172 (4th Cir. 2016) (“The Supreme Court has already performed an historical analysis of our
traditional understanding of a citizen’s right to keep a weapon at home for self-defense,
concluding that ‘the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth
and home’ lies at the core of the Second Amendment. Any prohibition or restriction imposed
by the government on the exercise of this right in the home clearly implicates conduct protected
by the Second Amendment.” (citation omitted) (quoting Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008)). But
see Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 661 (The Wrenn court analyzed the question more narrowly after starting
from higher level of generality. “[W]e conclude: the individual right to carry common firearms
beyond the home for self-defense—even in densely populated areas, even for those lacking
special self-defense needs—falls within the core of the Second Amendment’s protections.”).
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broad concept of “[s]elf-defense” as “‘the central component’ of the Second Amend-
ment’s guarantee of an individual’s right to keep and bear arms.”194 In Heller v. District
of Columbia (Heller II), Judges Ginsburg and Henderson and then-Judge, now Justice,
Kavanaugh divided on just how narrowly to assess an assault weapon prohibition.195
The Ginsburg-led majority interpreted the assault weapon prohibition as “a ban on
a sub-class of rifles” and upheld the law,196 while then-Judge Kavanaugh insisted on as-
sessing it as a “ban on semi-automatic rifles” as a class in his dissenting opinion.197
While in the vast majority of cases a high level of generality is used by judges to
argue against the constitutionality of gun laws, this is not always the case.198 In
Binderup v. Attorney General, a Third Circuit dissenting opinion used a high level of
generality to characterize the case in a manner more favorable to firearms regu-
lation.199 In Binderup, the plaintiffs had been convicted of arguably non-serious crimes
which, while characterized as misdemeanors under state law, prohibited plaintiffs
from possessing firearms.200 The majority struck down the statutory scheme as un-
constitutional as applied to the plaintiffs.201 Judge Fuentes, in a dissenting opinion
joined by six other judges, characterized the question at a high level of generality—
whether “even though [plaintiffs] were both convicted of crimes punishable by multiple
years in prison, Congress may not constitutionally prevent them from owning fire-
arms.”202 A narrower reading of the question would have been whether it is constitu-
tional to prohibit the possession of firearms by those convicted of the particular
misdemeanor, in this case, corrupting a minor and illegally carrying a firearm where
several years have passed since the crime.203 Similarly, in Jackson v. City & County
of San Francisco, a challenge to a prohibition on hollow-point bullets, a panel of the
Ninth Circuit assessed the historical scope of the right at a high level of generality—the
“right to obtain bullets necessary to use [firearms]”—before ultimately upholding
the law under intermediate scrutiny.204
194 Jackson v. City & County of San Francisco, 135 S. Ct. 2799, 2799 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (quoting McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010)).
195 See generally Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
196 Id. at 1268.
197 Id. at 1269 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
198 See Binderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc). Similarly, some
judges, especially in the context of as-applied challenges to laws prohibiting firearms possession
by certain classes of people, have applied a lower level of generality when seeking to strike
down specific applications of gun laws as unconstitutional. See, e.g., Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty.
Sheriff’s Dep’t, 775 F.3d 308, 316–17 (6th Cir. 2014).
199 836 F.3d at 380 (Fuentes, J., dissenting) (“The Second Amendment . . . does not prevent
Congress from deciding that convicted criminals should not have access to firearms.”).
200 Id. at 340.
201 Id. at 351.
202 Id. at 380 (Fuentes, J., dissenting).
203 See id. at 375–77 (majority opinion).
204 746 F.3d 953, 967 (9th Cir. 2014).
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Justice Alito’s dissent in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. City of New
York, a case challenging New York City’s rules regarding where guns can be trans-
ported, provides an example of a judge (or Justice in this case) analyzing the right
at a fairly high level of specificity, while still finding the law unconstitutional.205
Justice Alito articulated that the “core Second Amendment right, the right to keep
a handgun in the home for self-defense,” necessarily included “concomitant” rights
such as the specific rights “to take a gun for maintenance or repair . . . . to take a gun
outside the home in order to transfer ownership lawfully . . . . [and] to take a gun to
a range in order to gain and maintain the skill necessary to use it responsibly.”206
While defining the right in these narrow terms, Justice Alito still found that New
York City’s idiosyncratic rule, which limited gun owners to their homes and gun
ranges within the City, could not be justified and was unconstitutional.207
These cases aside, in most cases in which courts upheld a law under the Second
Amendment, the judges analyzed the constitutional scope question with a high level
of specificity.208 For example, in Teixeira v. County of Alameda, a Second Amendment
challenge to a county zoning ordinance brought by plaintiffs seeking to open a gun
store, the en banc Ninth Circuit looked to the narrow question of whether there is “a
freestanding right of commercial proprietors to sell firearms.”209 The en banc majority
opinion stated that “[t]he right to keep arms, necessarily involves the right to purchase
them” but found that was not the narrow question at issue.210 Rather, the plaintiffs
sought a right to sell firearms, “independent of the rights of his potential customers,”
a view which the court said would mean “that even if there were a gun store on
every square block . . . and therefore prospective gun purchasers could buy guns
with exceeding ease, [the plaintiffs] would still have a right to establish [their] own
gun store somewhere in the jurisdiction.”211 Similarly, in a challenge to a prohibition
on the possession of firearms by domestic violence misdemeanants, the Fourth Circuit
assessed “whether the possession of a firearm in the home by a domestic violence
205 140 S. Ct. 1525, 1527 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting).
206 Id. at 1541 (citing N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 888 F.3d 45,
58–59 (2d Cir. 2018)).
207 Id. at 1544.
208 See Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“The plaintiffs in the present case
challenge . . . the District’s gun laws . . . requiring the registration of firearms and prohibiting
both the registration of ‘assault weapons’ and the possession of magazines with a capacity
of more than ten rounds of ammunition.”).
209 873 F.3d 670, 673 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) aff’g No. 12-CV-03288-WHO, 2013 WL
4804756 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2013), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1988 (2018) (mem.).
210 Id. at 678 (alteration in original).
211 Id. at 681. The dissenting judges did not necessarily disagree with this framing, id. at
692 (Tallman, J., dissenting), but thought that the zoning ordinance combined with California’s
gun laws overall, “ma[de] it very difficult for individuals who wish[ed] to exercise their
Second Amendment rights to obtain, maintain, and comply with the burdensome California
state and federal laws which govern acquisition, ownership, carrying, and possession of
firearms protected by the Second Amendment.” Id. at 691.
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misdemeanant is protected by the Second Amendment” rather than home possession
more broadly, before ultimately upholding the law under intermediate scrutiny.212
It will be difficult for history to play an important role in Second Amendment
litigation if courts analyze questions about the Second Amendment’s scope with a
high degree of generality. If the question is something like, “is there some right to
carry firearms in public,” “does the Second Amendment include a right to train with
firearms,” or “does the Second Amendment include a right to ammunition,” the answer
will always be yes. If that is the case, then the step one historical analysis is just a
bit of throat clearing before going straight to the step two application of the tiers of
constitutional review. The same is true if a court wants to apply an analysis solely
focused on text, history, and tradition, as some judges have suggested.213 If the at-
issue regulation is a law regulating guns, then it falls within the scope of a broadly
defined historical right and should be struck down.214 An approach where history
barely matters is deeply inconsistent with Heller, which clearly envisioned history
playing an important role in the Second Amendment analysis and made clear that
the recognition of the Second Amendment right did not mark the end of firearms
regulation in the United States.215 A more specific analysis of the particular regula-
tion being challenged, intended to answer a distinct question about the scope of the
right being regulated, is more consistent with the approach laid out in Heller.216
B. The Level of Generality Courts Use in Defining Exceptions to the Second
Amendment Based on Historical Regulatory Traditions
Courts must also establish a level of generality when determining whether a
challenged gun law is consistent with a longstanding, historical tradition.217 This
analysis asks whether a challenged regulation is sufficiently analogous to histori-
cally accepted regulations to be presumptively lawful under the Heller framework.218
Must a regulation be nearly identical to those with long historical pedigrees or can
challenged laws be more broadly analogous?219
212 See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010); see also United States
v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[W]e must determine whether the pos-
session of an unmarked firearm in the home is protected by the right to bear arms.”).
213 See Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1269, 1271, 1276, 1285 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh,
J., dissenting).
214 See id. at 1272–73.
215 See Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 625–26 (2008).
216 See id. at 576–86.
217 See, e.g., Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89–90 (considering history and tradition of the
Second Amendment as an integral process in the Third Circuit’s two-step analysis).
218 Id.
219 Justice Roberts suggested that laws that are “lineal descendants” of historically accepted
gun laws are valid. Transcript of Oral Argument at 77, Heller I, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No.
07-290) (Chief Justice Roberts: “[W]e are talking about lineal descendants of the arms but
presumably there are lineal descendants of the restrictions as well.”).
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One example of where this generality issue arises is in challenges to laws requiring
background checks on firearms sales. In the present day, background checks are con-
ducted online, through a centralized computer database.220 There is obviously not a
long historical tradition of computerized background checks. However, a widely
adopted and NRA-supported law from the early twentieth century combined prohibi-
tions on firearms possession by certain criminals and those addicted to drugs, waiting
periods, and a requirement to present records of imminent sales to local law enforce-
ment in a way that looks a lot like a background check.221 The NRA described the
combination as allowing for a “police investigation” to show a purchaser has “a clean
record as an upright citizen.”222 If looked at from a moderate degree of generality,
this historical law provides a strong analogy to modern background check laws. How-
ever, if a court demands that a historical analogue match up with a challenged law
with a high degree of specificity, then this historical law—despite being aimed toward
the same goal and imposing arguably greater burdens—would be insufficient to
meet the longstanding test.223
In Marzzarella v. United States, the Third Circuit framed this question well in
the context of a challenge to the federal prohibition on firearms possession by
habitual drug users:
[D]oes 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3)’s prohibition of possession by
substance abusers violate the Second Amendment because no
restrictions on possession by substance abusers existed at the time
of ratification? Or is it valid because it presumably serves the
same purpose as restrictions on possession by felons—preventing
possession by presumptively dangerous individuals?224
Ultimately, the court upheld the regulation without fully answering the generality
question.225
220 See, e.g., Rocky Mountain Gun Owners v. Hickenlooper, 371 P.3d 768, 776–77 (Colo.
App. 2016) (upholding Colorado law imposing mandatory background checks on private
firearm sales based on findings that the law “does not infringe on individuals’ rights to keep
and bear arms for a lawful purpose” and “does not implicate a fundamental right”), aff’d, 467
P.3d 314 (Colo. 2020); Colo. Outfitters Ass’n v. Hickenlooper, 24 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1074–75
(D. Colo. 2014) (upholding aspects of the same Colorado law against a federal constitutional
challenge, and expressing “grave doubt” that such a law “implicates the Second Amendment’s
guarantee at all”), aff’d in part, 823 F.3d 537 (10th Cir. 2016); Peoples Rts. Org. v. Montgomery,
756 N.E.2d 127, 173 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (holding that background checks for firearms
sales “did not, in themselves, impermissibly infringe upon buyers’ right to bear arms”).
221 See, e.g., 1923 Cal. Stat. 696; 1923 N.H. Laws 138; 1925 Or. Laws 468; 1931 Pa. Laws
497; 47 Stat. 650 (1932).
222 Sportsmen Fight Sullivan Law, 23 AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 664 (1932).
223 See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 96 (3d Cir. 2010).
224 Id. at 93.
225 See id. at 99.
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The D.C. Circuit, on the other hand, debated the generality question at length in the
majority226 and dissenting opinions in Heller II.227 Judges Ginsburg and Henderson
clashed with then-Judge Kavanaugh on the constitutionality of D.C.’s requirement that
handguns be registered with the city.228 Ginsburg and Henderson, in the majority, up-
held the requirement as longstanding, pointing to several early twentieth-century laws
that required gun owners to register their handguns, or gun dealers to report the identity
of handgun purchasers to local government officials.229 The majority believed, “the his-
torical regulations and the District’s basic registration requirement are not just generally
alike, they are practically identical[] [because] [t]hey all require gun owners to give an
agent of the Government basic information about themselves and their firearm.”230
Judge Kavanaugh’s dissenting opinion contains probably the most detailed
description of the historical analysis in any Second Amendment case, including the
level of generality issue, and is worth quoting at length231:
[W]hen legislatures seek to address new weapons that have not tra-
ditionally existed or to impose new gun regulations because of
conditions that have not traditionally existed, there obviously will
not be a history or tradition of banning such weapons or imposing
such regulations. That does not mean the Second Amendment does
not apply to those weapons or in those circumstances. Nor does
it mean that the government is powerless to address those new
weapons or modern circumstances. Rather, in such cases, the
proper interpretive approach is to reason by analogy from history
and tradition.
. . . .
The Constitution is an enduring document, and its principles
were designed to, and do, apply to modern conditions and devel-
opments. The constitutional principles do not change (absent
amendment), but the relevant principles must be faithfully applied
not only to circumstances as they existed in 1787, 1791, and 1868,
for example, but also to modern situations that were unknown to
the Constitution’s Framers. To be sure, applying constitutional
principles to novel modern conditions can be difficult and leave
close questions at the margins. But that is hardly unique to the
226 See Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1256–58 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
227 See id. at 1269–96 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
228 See generally id. at 1244.
229 Id. at 1254–55 (majority opinion).
230 Id. at 1267.
231 See generally id. at 1269–96 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
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Second Amendment. It is an essential component of judicial
decisionmaking under our enduring Constitution.232
Judge Kavanaugh compared the analogical reasoning necessary to decide gun
cases to that applied in First and Fourth Amendment cases.233 Specifically, he cited
California v. Ciraolo, in which the Supreme Court approved the use of airplanes to
observe property for crime by relying on an analogy to the “common-law principle that
police could look at property when passing by homes on public thoroughfares.”234
Judge Kavanaugh described the analogical reasoning in Second Amendment
cases as occurring at a fairly high level of generality. A constable walking by a
home in eighteenth-century Boston and seeing a crime occurring in the front yard235
seems quite different from a police airplane discovering marijuana growing in an
inaccessible area of a farmer’s property.236 However, when analyzing the registration
issue in Heller II, Judge Kavanaugh demanded a virtually identical historical
tradition, rejecting the analogies relied on by the majority because “those state laws
generally required record-keeping by gun sellers, not registration of all lawfully
possessed guns by gun owners.”237 Judge Kavanaugh believed that relying on these
kinds of historical laws to support the registration requirement “is to conduct the
Heller analysis at an inappropriately high level of generality.”238
Judge Sykes of the Seventh Circuit similarly rejected a broad level of generality
in Ezell I, a challenge to the prohibition on gun ranges within the City of Chicago.239
In Ezell I, Chicago’s lawyers presented extensive historical evidence that cities and
states regulated and prohibited the discharge of firearms in cities.240 The majority deci-
sion, written by Judge Sykes, rejected this history of regulation as “merely regulatory
measures, distinguishable from the City’s absolute prohibition on firing ranges.”241
Judge Sykes also rejected historical laws that were nearly identical to the challenged
law because they “had clear fire-suppression purposes and do not support the prop-
osition that target practice at a safely sited and properly equipped firing range enjoys
no Second Amendment protection whatsoever.”242 Judge Sykes’s approach would
232 Id. at 1275.
233 Id.
234 Id. (citing California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986)).
235 See Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 631–32 (2008).
236 See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 212–13 (looking to the “history and genesis of the curtilage
doctrine” and finding that the officers have never been required “to shield their eyes when
passing by a home on public thoroughfares”).
237 Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1292 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
238 Id. at 1294. Judge Kavanaugh compared this analysis “to saying that because the gov-
ernment traditionally could prohibit defamation, it can also prohibit speech criticizing
government officials.” Id.
239 Ezell I, 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011).
240 See id. at 705–06.
241 Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 574, 632 (2008)).
242 Id.
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essentially require that historical traditions match the burden imposed by a present-day
law and have the same motivation for enactment.243 In contrast, the dissenting opinion
written by Judge Rovner criticized the majority’s “curt dismissal of actual regulations
of firearms discharges in urban areas.”244 Judge Rovner would have instead looked to
historical regulations as support for the application of a standard of review akin to
the time, place, and manner regulations applied in the First Amendment context.245
When the case returned to the Seventh Circuit in Ezell v. City of Chicago (Ezell II),
in a challenge to regulations imposed on newly legalized gun ranges, Judge Sykes took
a similar approach to a prohibition on children at ranges.246 She rejected the relevance
of “nineteenth-century state laws prohibiting firearm possession by minors and pro-
hibiting firearm sales to minors.”247 Judge Sykes found these historical regulations
had “little relevance to the issue at hand,” because “[t]here’s zero historical evidence
that firearm training for this age group is categorically unprotected.”248
Justice Alito in a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Thomas and Gorsuch,
also demanded a fairly high level of specificity in a case challenging New York City’s
rule regulating the transport of handguns to gun ranges and second homes outside
of the City.249 Justice Alito rejected the analogical value of historical regulations
which “restricted the places within their jurisdiction where a gun could be fired,”
because it failed to show “municipalities during the founding era prevented gun
owners from taking their guns outside city limits for practice.”250
The Fifth Circuit took a different approach in a case challenging the federal
prohibition on handgun sales to those under twenty-one.251 The court upheld the law
by looking to restrictions on young people at a higher level of generality, examining
dozens of nineteenth-century laws regulating the purchase and possession of fire-
arms by minors.252 The Fifth Circuit’s decision also placed prohibitions on possession
by children in the context of a broader historical tradition prohibiting firearms
possession by those deemed to lack “virtue” or an ability to act responsibly in
society—alongside prohibitions on felons and the seriously mentally ill.253
243 See id.
244 Id. at 713 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
245 Id. at 713–14 (“A complete ban on live-range training in Chicago, of course, likely
would not survive under the intermediate scrutiny applied to restrictions on time, place and
manner, especially because the City itself concedes the importance of this training to the safe
operation of firearms for self-defense in the home.”).
246 See generally 846 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2017).
247 Id. at 896.
248 Id.
249 See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525, 1527 (2020)
(Alito, J., dissenting).
250 Id. at 1541.
251 See generally Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, &
Explosives, 700 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 2012).
252 Id. at 201–03.
253 Id. at 200–02; see also Medina v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 152, 158–59 (D.C. Cir. 2019)
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Courts have also split on the appropriate level of generality in challenges to the
federal prohibition on firearms possession by those convicted of domestic violence
misdemeanors.254 The Ninth Circuit has held that because the government failed to
prove that “domestic violence misdemeanants in particular have historically been
restricted from bearing arms,” the law is not longstanding under the Second Amend-
ment analysis.255 In the Ninth Circuit’s view, “a regulation that merely resembles [one
of the longstanding regulations] listed by the Court in Heller will not avoid . . .
constitutional scrutiny.”256 Instead, a regulation “must be both longstanding and
closely match a listed prohibition,” or there must be “persuasive historical evidence
establishing that the regulation at issue imposes prohibitions that fall outside the
historical scope of the Second Amendment.”257 Several circuits have disagreed with
this very narrow view of the relevance of history.258 As the Seventh Circuit put it in
upholding the domestic violence prohibitor at step one: “[S]tatutory prohibitions on
the possession of weapons by some persons are proper—and . . . the legislative role
did not end in 1791. That some categorical limits are proper is part of the original
meaning, leaving to the people’s elected representatives the filling in of details.”259
The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have also adopted this less exacting form of ana-
logical reasoning, accepting the domestic violence misdemeanor prohibitor as
analogous to the prohibition on felons deemed longstanding in Heller.260
Inversely from the scope question, it will be difficult for history to play an
important role in Second Amendment litigation if courts analyze questions about
(using history of felons being stripped of rights and historical “laws disarming the unvirtuous”
to uphold federal prohibition on firearms possession by felons).
254 See United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1133–36 (9th Cir. 2013).
255 See id. at 1137 (emphasis omitted); see also United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673,
678 (4th Cir. 2010) (declining “to find § 922(g)(9) valid by analogy based on Heller’s
‘presumptively lawful’ language” (quoting United States v. Chester, 367 F. App’x 392, 398
(4th Cir. 2010))).
256 Teixeira v. County of Alameda, 822 F.3d 1047, 1057 (9th Cir. 2016) abrogated by
reh’g en banc, 873 F.3d 670 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1988 (2018) (mem.).
257 Id. at 1057–58 (first citing Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1137; and then citing Jackson v. City
& County of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 960 (9th Cir. 2014)).
258 See, e.g., United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010); In re United States,
578 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2009) (Murphy, J., dissenting); United States v. White, 593 F.3d
1199, 1206 (11th Cir. 2010).
259 Skoien, 614 F.3d at 640 (emphasis omitted). Then-Judge Barrett of the Seventh Circuit
would look at the question with an even higher level of generality, considering the prohibition
on firearms possession by “categories of people whose possession of firearms would en-
danger the public safety,” even if those precise restrictions did not exist during the founding
period. Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 464–65 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting).
260 See In re United States, 578 F.3d at 1195, 1195 n.1 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“The
majority seems to take comfort from Heller’s non-exhaustive recitation of categories of
prohibited persons . . . . This, however, does not catapult the government’s mandamus
petition into the ‘clear and indisputable’ classification.”); White, 593 F.3d at 1206 (upholding
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)).
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what types of regulations are longstanding with a very high degree of specificity.
Analyzing historical traditions with a high degree of specificity results in courts
either skipping over the historical analysis to get directly to the tiers of scrutiny or,
in a text, history, and tradition framework, simply striking down any law that does
not precisely match a historical tradition.261 The first approach is inconsistent with
Heller, which clearly placed an emphasis on history, and the second is belied by
Justice Alito’s assurance in McDonald that “[s]tate and local experimentation with
reasonable firearms regulations will continue under the Second Amendment.”262 An
approach more consistent with the Supreme Court’s decisions is that advocated for
(although not applied) by then-Judge Kavanaugh in his dissenting opinion in Heller
II.263 This approach assesses historical tradition in a way that allows the federal,
state, and local governments, “to address new weapons that have not traditionally
existed or to impose new gun regulations because of conditions that have not
traditionally existed.”264 This approach allows courts to remain true to the originalist
approach of Heller without limiting states to the precise legislative frameworks of
the past, which may not be effective or suitable to current conditions.
IV. USING HISTORY AT STEP TWO TO DETERMINE THE APPROPRIATE
TIER OF CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY
As discussed above, most courts have applied a two-step analysis in Second
Amendment cases, with the first step assessing whether a challenged regulation falls
within the scope of the Second Amendment right as historically understood, and the
second step applying one of the tiers of constitutional scrutiny.265 The role of history
is not necessarily limited to step one of this analysis. The historical scope of the right
assessed at step one is oftentimes used to determine the appropriate tier of constitu-
tional scrutiny to apply in a case.266
261 See Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1275 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (discussing how “traditional
restrictions go to show the scope of the right”).
262 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 785 (2010) (quoting Brief of the States
of Texas, Ohio, Arkansas, Georgia, Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Idaho,
Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, & Wyoming as Amici Curiae in Support
of Petitioners at 23, id. (No. 08-1521) (alteration in original)).
263 See Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1269–96 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
264 Id. at 1275.
265 For an excellent summary of, and argument for, the current framework, see generally
Brief of Second Amendment Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party,
N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020) (No. 18-280).
266 See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives,
700 F.3d 185, 195 (5th Cir. 2012).
2020] JUDGING HISTORY 451
This is often characterized as a question about whether a challenged regulation
falls within the “core” of the right protected by the Second Amendment or a more
periphery portion of the right.267 Generally, laws regulating the “core” right pro-
tected by the Second Amendment—which at least covers the right to possess a
handgun in the home for purposes of self-defense recognized in Heller—are subject
to strict scrutiny, while laws impacting the periphery of the right are subject to
intermediate scrutiny.268 In the words of Fifth Circuit Judge Prado, “the right of a
law-abiding, responsible adult to possess and use a handgun to defend his or her
home and family[]—triggers strict scrutiny,” while a less burdensome regulation
“requires a less demanding means-ends showing.”269 Going further, Judge Prado
stated that if a law “is not a salient outlier in the historical landscape of gun control,”
it does not trigger strict scrutiny.270
Judge Clifton of the Ninth Circuit argued for the use of history at step two,
arguing that even if history is insufficient to show a challenged law falls outside the
scope of the right or is a presumptively lawful longstanding regulation, the wide-
spread and longstanding adaptation of similar laws at least shows that a regulation
does not fall within the “core of the Second Amendment” and should be subject to
“intermediate scrutiny.”271 The Second Circuit took a similar approach, finding that
history showed “states have long recognized a countervailing and competing set of
concerns with regard to handgun ownership and use in public” and recognized a
“substantial role for state regulation,” meaning that intermediate scrutiny was the
proper standard to apply.272
This use of history to guide the step-two analysis is not without its critics. The
most notable is then–Seventh Circuit Judge, now Justice, Barrett, who argued that
applying intermediate scrutiny to a prohibition on firearms possession by felons
267 Id. (“[O]bserving that a ‘severe burden on the core Second Amendment right of armed
self-defense should require a strong justification,’ but ‘less severe burdens on the right’ and
‘laws that do not implicate the central self-defense concern of the Second Amendment[] may
be more easily justified’ . . . .” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Chester, 628
F.3d 673, 682 (4th Cir. 2010))).
268 See id.
269 Nat’l Rifle Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 195 (citations omitted); see also Heller II, 670 F.3d at
1257 (“[A] regulation that imposes a substantial burden upon the core right of self-defense
protected by the Second Amendment must have a strong justification, whereas a regulation
that imposes a less substantial burden should be proportionately easier to justify.”); United
States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 470 (4th Cir. 2011) (observing that the analysis turns
on “the character of the Second Amendment question presented”—that is, “the nature of a
person’s Second Amendment interest, [and] the extent to which those interests are burdened
by government regulation”).
270 Nat’l Rifle Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 205.
271 Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1076 (9th Cir. 2018) (Clifton, J., dissenting), reh’g
en banc granted, 915 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2019) (mem.).
272 Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 93–96 (2d Cir. 2012).
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because felons are further from the core right protected by the Second Amendment
was “circular” because it assumes weakened protection of the right before demand-
ing a weaker review of the government’s justification.273
This application of history to determine the appropriate tier of constitutional
scrutiny is consistent with both the way the Supreme Court treats other rights and
the originalist methodology demanded by Heller.274 As an initial matter, applying
a different standard to a Second Amendment right in different contexts is no differ-
ent than how other constitutional rights are treated. In the First Amendment context,
courts apply various tiers of scrutiny and tests depending on the precise type of
speech regulated.275 Similarly, different standards apply under the Fourth Amend-
ment, depending on where and how a search occurs.276 Tying the decision about the
appropriate tier of scrutiny to the historical analysis also brings the two-part test more
in line with the originalist methodology in Heller and helps to avoid applying a
scrutiny analysis at step two that varies too significantly from the historical analysis
at step one.277
CONCLUSION
In 2010, Justice Scalia defended originalist methodology in a concurring
opinion in McDonald v. City of Chicago, stating:
I think it beyond all serious dispute that it is much less subjec-
tive, and intrudes much less upon the democratic process. It is
less subjective because it depends upon a body of evidence
susceptible of reasoned analysis rather than a variety of vague
ethico-political First Principles whose combined conclusion can
be found to point in any direction the judges favor.278
The proceeding sections have shown that an originalist methodology, even if the
history is examined in an evenhanded manner, retains enormous opportunity for a
judge’s “ethico-political First Principles” to influence the result of a case.279 What
273 See Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 465 n.13 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting).
274 Compare id. at 465 (Barrett, J., dissenting), with Heller I, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
275 See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
936–1153 (3d ed. 2006) (discussing various First Amendment doctrines).
276 See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (allowing police to stop and frisk when they
reasonably believe a suspect is armed and poses a threat to officers’ safety); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961) (requiring the exclusion of evidence seized during the warrantless
search of a home).
277 See Barnett & Bernick, supra note 38, at 33–36 (discussing the need for “good faith”
applications of constitutional tests that are consistent with historical understanding).
278 561 U.S. 742, 804 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
279 See id.
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history is considered and at what level of generality it is analyzed very often proves
decisive in cases. This kind of judicial policymaking is especially invidious because
it is hidden behind the veneer of neutral methodological decisions. This is particu-
larly true in the Second Amendment context, where the body of historical regula-
tion, case law, and scholarly and popular commentary is so large and spread over
such a broad period of time that radically different conclusions can be reached based
on barely visible changes in methodology.280
History matters in Second Amendment litigation, and the decisions courts make
as to what history to look at should be made in a conscious and transparent manner.281
In deciding Second Amendment cases, courts should be cognizant of the method-
ological decisions they are making. They should make them explicitly and openly
address the broader implications. As to what methodological decisions should be
made, courts should not strike down the reasoned judgment of state legislatures and
Congress when there are plausible historical arguments for a challenged law’s
constitutionality. To that effect, methodological decisions should be made allowing
state and local governments to draw from as broad a range of historical sources as
necessary to make these arguments. This is important because of the judicial role
and the need for deference to legislative decision-making. It is also important
because originalism does not function as a methodology to coherently decide cases
when history is analyzed too restrictively. If courts look to a narrow band of history,
ignore regulatory traditions supporting challenged gun laws, and demand historical
traditions precisely match a challenged gun law, then there really will not be much
of a historical analysis to do at all. Originalism needs historical source material to
function, and a too-narrow view denies it that.
Guns have been regulated throughout American history,282 and gun laws have
always evolved to meet changing public needs. The courts should not end that
tradition by applying an excessively restrictive form of originalism.
280 See supra Part II.
281 See supra Part III.
282 See generally Repository of Historical Gun Laws, supra note 99.
